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Analysis of the Effects of Georgia House Bill 1113 (2008):  
A Case Study of the Georgia Institute of Technology’s Department of Internal Auditing 
Executive Summary 
 
 Ethical behavior on the part of public administrators has been understood to be one of the 
guiding principles of public service.  When public administrators decide to cross the line into 
behavior that is not only considered to be unethical but unlawful, they have not only put their 
own careers and livelihood in jeopardy, they have betrayed the public’s trust.  Betrayal of the 
public trust by state and public university employees was one of the motivating forces behind 
Georgia House Bill 1113 (2008).  This legislation which subsequently resulted in significant 
changes to the University System of Georgia’s policy regarding the reporting of employee 
malfeasance continues to have a significant impact on the internal auditing function of this 
state’s public colleges and universities. 
 For this reason, the purpose of this research is to inform public administrators, 
particularly those working within the University System of Georgia, about the policies and 
standards which they are operating under.  This case study of the Georgia Institute of 
Technology’s Department of Internal Auditing reaction to Georgia House Bill 1113 will provide 
public administrators with a roadmap outlining how one group of public administrators has 
effectively accepted the challenge of maintaining the public’s trust by actively combating 
employee malfeasance on its campus.  Research findings indicate that they’ve not only 
successfully installed a fraud risk awareness and mitigation program within their audit function, 
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Analysis of the Effects of Georgia 2008 House Bill 1113:  
A Case Study of the Georgia Institute of Technology’s Department of Internal Auditing 
Introduction 
 
 Unethical behavior by public administrators and government officials rarely fails to 
capture headlines in the local and national media or the attention of elected officials who are in 
close proximity to the publicized misdeeds. Stories of corrupted public officials date back to 
Biblical times and even a relatively young country like the United States is not without its share 
of these tales.  Perhaps the most notorious example would be what is known as the Watergate 
Scandal of the early 1970s which resulted in the collapse of President Nixon’s administration, 
the jailing of numerous public officials, and a heightened public awareness of unethical behavior 
in government. In spite of numerous laws, ethics codes, and media exposure of those involved, 
unethical behavior by public administrators remains a challenge from Washington D.C. to the 
local cities and school boards.  
In 2007, the State of Georgia was embroiled in a financial scandal that extended from the 
state’s top public universities and colleges to several departments of government.  The scandal 
originated in the discovery by state and university auditors of numerous instances of fraud 
involving the state’s purchasing card (PCard) program.  According to the University System of 
Georgia, the PCard program is:  
designed for the cost-effective purchase of supplies, goods, and 
services subject to applicable state laws, rules, and regulations to 
include those guidelines issued by the Georgia Department of 
Administrative Services (DOAS). A PCard means a charge card 
issued by a credit card company, bank, or other financial institution 
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and provided by the State of Georgia or any of its departments or 
agencies under the State of Georgia Purchasing Card Program to 
state employees for the purpose of making small dollar purchases 
on behalf of such departments or agencies of the state (University 
System of Georgia 2010b).   
At the request of then-Governor Sonny Perdue, the University System of Georgia (USG) auditors 
conducted an audit of USG PCard transactions for the entire 2007 fiscal year.  In February of 
2008, the audit report was released and found that “while the overwhelming majority of 
transactions reviewed were legitimate, problems with the Purchasing, or PCard, program can be 
traced to a lack of managerial oversight and control at every level.  There were 22 cases of 
identified fraud, which ranged from a low of $20 to a high of $318,324, resulted in the 
termination of 10 employees, the resignation of 11 employees, and reprimands for five 
employees” (Millsaps 2008, 1). The report received both local and national attention from 
various media outlets. 
Furthermore, the report was issued during the 2008 Georgia legislative session.  In the 
wake of the report, a bi-partisan group of legislators in the Georgia House introduced House Bill 
1113 (HB 1113), which took direct aim at issues created by the PCard scandal and addressed the 
use of state funds for personal gain and resulting penalties in a manner that had not been codified 
in state law before” (Heard, et al. 2008). The legislation was passed by the State Legislature and 




 On the heels of the passage of HB 1113, Ronald B. Stark, Chief Audit Officer and 
Associate Vice Chancellor for the USG issued a memorandum to the Presidents, Chief Academic 
Officers, and Chief Business Officers and to all USG colleges and universities stating that all 
schools must report any and all suspected employee fraud to his office without delay (Stark 
2008, 1).  In addition to the new reporting requirements, the memo also stated that the Internal 
Audit Office for the USG would be communicating these reports of suspected employee 
malfeasance to the Georgia Attorney General’s (AG) Office for potential criminal prosecution. 
Mr. Stark’s memorandum on malfeasance definitions and reporting has since been formalized in 
the USG’s Business Procedures Manual (University System of Georgia 2010a).  This represented 
a sudden and significant change in USG policy that public administrators, from middle-
management to the executive suite at all 31 USG colleges and universities, had to address. 
The purpose of this project is to employ a case study approach in order to analyze of the 
actions of a public university after the passage of HB 1113 and subsequent USG policy changes.  
The objective is to provide the reader with analysis using actual examples of how public 
administrators have addressed and complied with general Internal Auditing industry standards 
for handling fraud perpetrated by employees and how they have adapted to sudden and 
significant changes to law and policy. The subject chosen for this case study is the Georgia 
Institute of Technology’s Department of Internal Auditing (GT-DIA).  The Georgia Institute of 
Technology (the Institute) is a public university which falls under the purview and administration 
of the USG and as such is subject to Federal and State laws, as well as, USG policies.  
The new USG policy on malfeasance derived from HB 1113 represented a significant 
change in operational duties for college and university internal audit departments.  How have the 
public administrators, particularly internal auditors, of the USG schools reacted to this sudden 
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and significant change in policy?  What have they done to achieve compliance with law and 
policy from tactical and strategic perspectives? 
HB 1113 
 
Legislation from elected officials seeks to create or amend existing laws to meet specific 
challenges or needs.  Often, those who draft the legislation summarize the purpose, intent or the 
spirit in which the law they would like passed. HB 1113’s summary states that its purpose is: 
To amend Part 1 of Article 3 of Chapter 5 of Title 50 of the 
Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to general authority, 
duties, and procedure with regard to state purchasing, so as to 
prohibit the use of state funds by purchase orders, government 
contracts, credits cards, charge cards, or debit cards, or other such 
payment vehicles for personal benefit or gain; to provide 
definitions; to provide for the requirements of a state purchasing 
card program; to provide penalties for violators; to authorize the 
promulgation of rules and regulations; to amend Article 2 of 
Chapter 7 of Title 45 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, 
relating to reimbursements for public officers and employees, so as 
to prohibit state officers and employees from misappropriating 
advances of public funds, submitting fraudulent reimbursement 
requests, or approving fraudulent reimbursement requests; to 
provide for penalties; to provide for related matters; to provide for 
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effective dates and applicability; to repeal conflicting laws; and for 
other purposes (Heard, et al. 2008). 
Immediate changes called for by HB 1113 can be summarized:  specific restrictions on 
certain items (i.e. gift cards), tighter controls on receipts from goods purchased, training and 
ethics requirements for PCard holders and their managers, quarterly and annual review of 
purchases, criminal and credit background checks for card holders, clearly defined punishment 
for violators and supervisors, and a “zero tolerance” policy for PCard misuse, regardless of the 
amount in question (Heard, et al. 2008).   
USG Policy on Malfeasance Reporting 
 On May 6, 2008, Presidents, Chief Business Officers, and Chief Academic Officers of all 
USG Schools receive a memorandum from Ronald B. Stark.  Mr. Stark was the Chief Audit 
Officer & Associate Vice Chancellor for the USG at the time.  This memorandum was in regards 
to USG employee malfeasance and HB 1113.  Critical portions of Mr. Stark’s memorandum read 
(Stark 2008, 1): 
The recent PCard audit and associated alleged fraud has resulted in 
a requirement for more formalized reporting of alleged employee 
malfeasance to both my office and to the Attorney General’s 
Office.  Additionally, the General Assembly passed House Bill 
(HB) 1113 on the last day of the Session. HB 1113 also addressed 
aspects of PCard program management, penalties associated with 
PCard misuse, and the penalties associated with misuse of travel 
advances and fraudulent requests to the state for reimbursement. … 
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Effective immediately, all USG institutions are expected to report 
all suspected malfeasance to my office.  Currently the USG BPM 
Section 16.4.5 requires institutions to report malfeasance only 
when it has been “determined that a ‘high likelihood’ of 
impropriety greater than $1000 has occurred.” However, the 
Attorney General’s (AG’s) Office has since requested that they be 
provided an opportunity to review all cases of alleged employee 
malfeasance (Stark 2008, 1).   
 Mr. Stark’s memorandum on reporting suspected employee was later formalized into the 
USG’s Business Procedurals Manual (BPM). Section 16.4.3 was added to clarify which college 
and university organizations would be responsible for the actual reporting of suspected 
malfeasance (University System of Georgia 2010).  According to the BPM,  
The Office of Internal Audit and Compliance has the primary 
obligation for investigating reported malfeasance for the 
University System Office (USO) and for institutions without an 
institutional auditor. Institutional Audit departments have the 
primary obligation for malfeasance investigations at local 
campuses. The Internal Audit departments at both the Board level 
and the institutional level may contact other departments, including 
the Legal Office and university police departments, to establish the 
necessary team to proceed with the review or investigation 
(University System of Georgia 2010). 
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USG policy is clear in stating that the responsibility for reporting employee malfeasance 
lies with the campus’ Internal Audit departments. 
Literature Review 
Literature for this case study was collected through information obtained from various 
sources. The literature was gathered from areas that are more general in nature, such as standards 
and certifications put forth by the internal auditing and fraud investigation industries.  This 
literature was combined with public records maintained by the State of Georgia, the USG and 
GT, as well as, interviews with key personnel.  
Industry Certifications and Standards  
 As stated in the introduction, the new USG policy mandates that the Internal Auditing 
function of each school will be directly responsible for reporting employee fraud or malfeasance.  
This calls into question the capabilities, training and education of those employed within each 
school’s internal auditing function.  As all public administrators do not fit the same mold in their 
job responsibilities, neither do all USG auditors.  Industry competency can be expressed through 
the attainment of certifications by the auditor and there are several organizations which provide 
certifications based on the auditor’s area of expertise.  It can be said that the traditional concept 
of an auditor is that of a professional whose background is one of financial proficiency and is 
commonly associated auditing the tax returns of citizens under the guidance of the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS).  While the traditional accounting auditors made famous (or infamous) by 
the IRS are still a significant portion of the industry, other areas of auditing expertise have been 
on the rise for the last several decades.  The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), for example, 
offers the official recognition of the Certified Internal Auditor® (CIA) certification.  According 
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to their literature, a CIA candidate must be able to pass pre-qualification screening, which 
includes the completion of a four-year degree from an accredited college or university, over two 
years of experience working within the auditing industry, and a character reference signed by an 
existing certificate holder (The IIA 2013).  Once pre-qualifications have been met, the candidate 
must be able to pass a four-part exam covering governance and auditing principles, adherence to 
ethics standards, and certification maintenance through continued professional education (The 
IIA 2013).  Based on this information, only educated and experienced individuals will qualify to 
hold this certification. According to an IIA press release in 2011, there are over 100 thousand 
CIA’s world-wide (The IIA 2011). 
Auditors whose job functions require them to focus more on technology rather than 
finance might pursue the Certified Information Systems Auditor (CISA) certification issued by 
the Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA).  As with the CIA certification, 
CISA candidates must have four-year degree from an accredited college or university and at least 
three years of security, information systems, or auditing experience and pass a rigorous written 
exam (ISACA 2013). Unlike the CIA, however, CISA candidates are eligible to take the 
certification exam prior to meeting the education eligibility requirements.  However, even if they 
pass the exam, they are not considered CISAs until all qualifications have been satisfied.  CISAs 
are also required to maintain their certification through continued professional education and 
must attain at least 120 hours of continued education over a period of three years and adhere to 
the organization’s ethics standards (ISACA 2013).   As with the CIA, CISAs are highly educated 
and experience individuals who maintain their certifications through practice and education. 
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Those auditors who are tasked with auditing specifically for fraud would probably 
consider obtaining the Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE) credentials issued by the Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE).  Unlike the CIA and CISA, the CFE candidate must acquire 
a certain amount of ACFE points to qualify.  While a college degree does substantially increase 
the candidate’s point score, unlike the CIA or CISA, it is not a requirement.  The ACFE also 
places great value in the candidate’s experience, as well as, their ability to pass a written exam 
(ACFE 2013).   As with other certifications, continued professional education is mandatory. 
Of course, there is the traditional standard for most banking and financial professionals, 
which is the Certified Public Accountant (CPA).  According to literature on the American 
Institute of CPAs (AICPA), candidates seeking the CPA certification must have at least 150 
semester hours of college education and pass a comprehensive written exam. Furthermore, unlike 
the CIA, CISA, and CFE which are global certifications, the CPA is licensed under a particular 
state’s Board of Accountancy (AICPA 2013).  
While there are several other industry certifications which focus further on specific skills, 
the above-mentioned certifications should be accepted as the most common.  It is also not 
uncommon for auditors to hold one or more industry accepted certifications.  This is also not 
uncommon amongst auditors in leadership positions who must be prepared to evaluate controls 
across multiple disciplines. Even though certifications address specific auditor competencies and 
education, the guiding principles for internal auditing industry are the “Standards for the 
Professional Practice of Internal Auditing” which are published by the Institute of Internal 
Auditors (IIA) (The Institute of Internal Auditors 1997).  These standards are comprehensive and 
provide the framework and criteria by which internal auditing groups are expected to operate.  
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Section 280 of the Standards speaks to the internal auditor’s responsibilities in the matters of 
fraud within their organization.  Section 280.02 states, “Internal auditors are not expected to have 
knowledge equivalent to that of a person whose primary responsibility is detecting and 
investigating fraud” (The Institute of Internal Auditors 1997, 25).  However, that same section 
clarifies that internal auditors are to “have sufficient knowledge of fraud to be able to identify 
indicators that fraud may have been committed … be alert to opportunities, such as control 
weaknesses that could allow fraud … and to notify the appropriate authorities within the 
organization if a determination is made that there are sufficient indicators of the commission of a 
fraud to recommend an investigation” (The Institute of Internal Auditors 1997, 25).    
 At this is point it has been established that internal auditors should be aware of industry 
guidance and education, as well as, adhere to their industry’s operational standards which 
include a basic ability to identify and report on fraud within their organization. To focus in on the 
details of this case study, specific and relevant literature must be examined. 
Employee Malfeasance 
It is important to understand the spirit of the time in which HB 1113 and the USG Policy 
on Reporting Employee Malfeasance came to fruition.  In addition to release of the USG Audit 
Report on PCards, press releases by the Georgia Attorney General’s Office and reports from 
print and television media during the spring of 2008 were exposing higher education public 
administrators’ abuse of the public trust through their fraudulent actions.  Two of the most 
egregious examples were those of Michelle Harris and Donna Gamble:   
 Michelle Harris 
According to a press release by Georgia Attorney General Thurbert Baker, while Ms. 
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Harris was employed at Georgia Tech’s College of Management, she was issued a PCard, 
which she misused for personal gain. Harris used her PCard pay for many personal items, 
including her wedding cake, and other personal expenses totaling $173,186.46 over a 
period of several years (Baker 2008). Ms. Harris eventually pled guilty to racketeering in 
2009 and was sentenced to 10 years in jail and 10 years probation (Siegel 2011, 235). 
 Donna Gamble 
According to an Atlanta Business Chronicle article, Ms. Gamble was employed by 
Georgia Tech in the Institute for Bioengineering and Bioscience. During her employment 
she used her Georgia Tech PCards to make over 3,800 transactions for personal items, at 
a total cost of more than $316,000 (Atlanta Business Chronicle 2008).  In an effort to 
conceal her crimes, she forged payment receipts and her supervisor’s signature and also 
manipulated the accounting records (Atlanta Business Chronicle 2008). Ms. Gamble pled 
guilty to 22 counts of mail fraud in Federal Court and was sent to Federal prison (Atlanta 
Business Chronicle 2008). 
While Ms. Harris and Ms. Gamble represented the largest amounts of higher education 
employee malfeasance during the spring of 2008, they were certainly not alone.  They were 
joined by several other university employees making the news over their malfeasance: 
 Wanda Wilson 
According to Atlanta WSB News, Wilson, a former employee Georgia Tech’s School of 
Electrical and Computer Engineering was arrested and ultimately pled guilty to “two 
counts of theft by taking. The GBI says she used her state issued purchasing card for a 
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laptop computer, a web cam and Internet chat headset. The total value was $724” 
(WSBTV 2008). 
 Angela Young 
Atlanta WSB News reported that Angela Young, a Georgia Tech employee in the College 
of Computing was arrested in March of 2008 and charged with eight felony counts of 
theft by taking. The GBI reports stated that she used her PCard to illegally purchase 
$936.92 cable television and pay-per-view videos at her residence (WSBTV 2008). 
 Jana Chambers 
Atlanta WBS News also reported that Jana Chambers, a former Georgia Tech employee 
was arrested on March 19 [2008] and was charged with six counts of felony theft by 
taking.  According to the GBI, Ms. Chambers used her PCard to purchase personal 
DVD’s and make-up valued at $604.02 (WSBTV 2008). 
Certainly these few people do not represent the thousands of honest public administrators 
within GT.  However, the betrayal of public trust by a few employees and the subsequent media 
coverage of these facts during the spring of 2008 almost certainly affected the decisions by 
Georgia lawmakers and USG leadership to make sweeping changes in laws and policy related to 
public employee malfeasance. 
Malfeasance Defined 
In addition to adding reporting requirements on the discovery of fraud being committed 
by USG employees, the new policy further defined employee malfeasance, which until 2008 had 
loose interpretations at the various USG schools.  This is not surprising since the existing policy 
had gaps and was subject to each school’s own interpretation. This idea is also consistent with 
13 
 
some of the basic concepts of public administration theory.  In the book Public Administration: 
Social Change and Adaptive Management authors Cayer and Weschler point out “subunits may 
diverge in their pursuit of organizational goals.  Subunits develop their own norms and ways of 
doing things that may not be consistent with the needs of the organization as a whole.  The 
resulting dissonance may impede the rational pursuit of the overall goal” (Cayer and Weschler 
2003, 16-17). This certainly appears to be the case with the 31 schools of the USG and how each 
school may have defined malfeasance.   
The new USG definition of malfeasance states, “employee malfeasance generally include 
instances of embezzlement, misappropriation, alteration or falsification of documents, false 
claims, theft of any asset, inappropriate use of computer systems to include hacking and software 
piracy, bribery or kickback, etc.” (Stark 2008, 2).  This broader definition of employee 
malfeasance also provided with USG public administrators with new and different challenges to 
address.  However, the goal of removing ambiguity from definitions and scope of employee 
malfeasance was achieved.   
Malfeasance Reporting Responsibilities 
As stated earlier, USG policy on malfeasance reporting mandates that, “institutional 
Audit departments have the primary obligation for malfeasance investigations at local campuses” 
(University System of Georgia 2010).  Unlike many other schools within the USG, GT has their 
own audit department with multiple auditing divisions.  After review of industry requirements 
and expectations regarding auditor competencies and their ability to identify fraud, it is clear that 
the USG policy on malfeasance (or fraud) reporting is well within the defined standards for the 





The methodology for this project is an exploratory case study of the internal auditing 
departments of GT. The 2008 PCard Audit Report released by USG outlined 22 cases of “notable 
violations and fraud” and of these 22 cases, 12 cases occurred at GT (USG Office of Internal 
Audit 2008). Ethical considerations for this include using only information that is available via 




The study looked at how GT-DIA existed prior to the PCard scandal and HB 1113 and 
how it has adapted to the subsequent policy changes from 2007 to 2013.  This includes the 
collection and qualitative analysis of data related to the departments’ budgets, organizational 
structures, internal policies and procedures, staffing decisions, training curriculum, and tools 
acquisitions specific to the internal audit function.  Data was obtained through intensive 
interviews with key personnel (see Appendix A), as well as, requests for public records under the 
Georgia Open Records Act.  The data was broken down into six key sections for review: 
1. Department Activities 
2. Staffing and Industry Certifications 
3. Department Budget 
4. Employee Training 
5. Tools and Resources 
6. External Assessment 
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The data collected has been analyzed and compared to see if and how the public 
administrators in GT-DIA have allocated resources to achieve compliance with USG policy, 
audit industry standards, and state law.  The method of data collection for this was approved by 
Kennesaw State University’s Institutional Review Board on February 8, 2013.  Interviews and 
records review with key GT-DIA personnel took place on March 18, 2013 in their office at 
Georgia Tech in Atlanta, GA. 
Findings 
 
 The findings for this case study indicate that GT-DIA was affected by HB 1113 and 
changes to USG Policy.  The ripple effects of the policy change appear throughout the 
department.  While many departments undergo change due to routine circumstances, such as 
employee turnover, new leadership, or fiscal restructuring, GT-DIA’s activities, capabilities, 
financial requirements, training, and resources are very different today than in 2007.   
1. Department Activities 
 
 GT-DIA’s operations and activities consist of regular, planned audit engagements with 
various Georgia Tech schools and departments, which are standard operating procedure for most 
internal auditing functions.  These activities are classified as “Departmental Reviews”.  
However, audit activities that involve suspected employee malfeasance are categorized as 
“Special Reviews” and are assigned with coding label identifying them as such (Auditing 2013).   
According to GT-DIA records and interviews, GT-DIA has seen a significant increase in Special 
Reviews reported over the past years.  This indicates that GT-DIA has been complying with 
USG requirements on reporting suspected employee malfeasance.  Illustration 1.1 shows the 
increase of GT-DIA Special Reviews since 2007 (Auditing 2013): 
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Illustration 1.1 – GT-DIA Special Reviews 
 
Source: Auditing 2013 
  
 According to their information and records, GT-DIA’s Special Review cases involving 
suspected employee malfeasance has increase from twelve cases in FY2007 to twenty-eight 
cases in FY2012 (Note, FY2013 is still underway as of this publication).  This represents an 
increase of over 133% in cases alone and according to the GT-DIA Director, these numbers 
directly attributable to HB 1113 and the subsequent USG employee malfeasance reporting 
requirements (Auditing 2013).  
 HB 1113 also brought other changes to GT-DIA activities, as well.  According to the GT-
DIA Director, “Prior to HB 1113, judgment on employee issues was kept as a local decision or 
choice by university management.  Leadership decisioning was replaced by legal precedent for 
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culpability in the suspected malfeasance. This resulted in a dramatic increase in the need for 
fraud detection capabilities including a fraud risk assessment program.  We’ve also added a fraud 
awareness element to our standard audit program called Departmental Reviews” (Auditing 
2013).  
2. Staffing and Industry Certifications 
 
The change in activity related to HB 1113 also resulted in substantial staffing changes 
within GT-DIA. In 2007, staffing levels included nine (9) full-time employees (FTEs), eight of 
which were dedicated to audit functions.  The organization was headed by the Chief Audit 
Executive and was sub-divided into two groups: Operational and Financial Audits and 
Information Systems Audits.  Each group was managed by an Associate Director and each 
auditor held, at a minimum, a Bachelor’s degree.  Most auditors held advance degrees and 
industry certifications.  See Illustration 1.1 for more details on GT-DIA’s staffing and 
certifications in 2007. 
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Illustration 2.1 – GT-DIA Organization in 2007 
 
Source: Auditing 2013 
 
 By 2013, GT-DIA’s organization had changed significantly.  In addition to a new Chief 
Audit Executive, the organization has reorganized with a greater focus on fraud auditing and 
detection.  This is evident in the additional FTEs, including an Associate Director for 
Investigations, as well as, the increased levels of industry certifications.  In 2007, GT-DIA did 
not have an auditor on staff with a CFE certification.  As of 2013, three members of their staff 
hold the CFE certification [see Illustration 1.2 for more details on staffing changes and 
certifications]. 
Director of Internal Auditing 

























Illustration 2.2 – GT-DIA Organization in 2013 
 
Source: Auditing 2013 
 
 As of 2013, GT-DIA has filled thirteen FTE positions.  In addition to the FTEs, they 
currently employ four Georgia Tech student employees and have plans to expand the student 
employee program in the future. According to staffing time allocations, student employees are 
counted as half of FTE.  Therefore, four student employees are counted as two FTEs for 
employment head counting statistics.  This brings GT-DIA’s 2013 staffing head count to a total 
of fifteen FTEs, compared to nine in 2007.   This represents a 66% increase in staffing for GT-
DIA.  
Director of Internal Auditing 













(IS) Audit Manager 
























Illustration 2.3 – GT-DIA FTE Staffing Levels 
 
Source: Auditing 2013 
According to information provided by the GT-DIA Director, at least three of the FTE 
positions (50% of the FTE increase) are directly attributable to HB 1113 and the subsequent 
USG employee malfeasance reporting requirements (Auditing 2013).  This data shows that GT-
DIA has expanded their staff and industry certifications to address the need of being able to 
properly identify suspected employee malfeasance, as prescribed by USG policy. 
3. Department Budget 
 
 Along with staffing increases, GT-DIA experienced budget increases during this time 
period, as well.  According to GT-DIA records, in 2007, the department’s budget was at $820 
Thousand.  As of 2013, the budget stands at over $1.1 million.  This is an increase of over $280 
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Illustration 3.1 – GT-DIA Budget Levels 
 
Source: Auditing 2013 
 
According to information provided by the GT-DIA Director, at least $150,000 of the 
$280,000 budget increase during that time period (53% of the budget increase) is directly 
attributable to HB 1113 and subsequent USG employee malfeasance reporting requirements 
(Auditing 2013). This data indicates that GT-DIA has received funding increases from Georgia 
Tech to specifically address reporting and investigative capabilities on suspected employee 
malfeasance. 
4. Employee Training 
 
 As seen under the increase in staffing, GT-DIA has experienced an increase in industry 
certifications and training since 2007.  According to the GT-DIA Director, the department policy 
has always included regular employee training and industry certification.  He stated further that, 
“After HB 1113 we had the need to include CFE and forensics certifications to our inventory.  

































investigative team.  One of those FTEs is currently pursuing a GIAC Certified Forensics Analyst 
(GCFA) certification to expand our abilities in the areas of computer forensics and data analysis” 
(Auditing 2013).   The Director elaborated further that GT-DIA auditors are in the process of 
migrating to more adaptive skill set and that given the exposure employee malfeasance at the 
university that all auditors have a basic knowledge of fraud detection and identification 
(Auditing 2013).  As a result of this, one of the GT-DIA auditors assigned to audit the automated 
continuous monitoring tool for the university’s PCard system of record has obtained a CFE 
certification, as well (Auditing 2013).    
Furthermore, all GT-DIA auditors are expected to be actively engaged in their respective 
industry organizations.  According to the current President of the Association of College and 
University Auditors (ACUA), GT-DIA plays an active role in the organization by serving on 
organizational committees, teaching classes as subject matter experts, and coordinating events at 
the organization’s annual conferences (Auditing 2013).  This information shows that GT-DIA 
has placed employee training related to identifying and reporting on employee malfeasance as a 
prior within their department. 
5. Tools and Resources 
 
 In addition to staffing, budgetary, and employee training increases, GT-DIA auditors 
have also experienced an increase in other resources and tools since 2007, many of which are 
used to detect employee malfeasance.  These tools have been deployed at the enterprise-level and 
at the local department level.  According to the GT-DIA Director, “We have advised the 
university on implementing automated data analytics tools and platforms to provide more 
oversight of various financial systems.  These tools have enabled management and Internal 
Auditing to be more responsive to anomalies which could represent fraudulent activity.  As the 
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Institute has been receiving more Federal agency oversight, these tools have also been very 
useful in providing them pertinent information on a timely basis” (Auditing 2013).   
 GT-DIA also manages the university’s ethics hotline and has engaged in promotional and 
customer relations engagements to advertise the service (Auditing 2013).  Illustration 5.1 show 
an example of a postcard which was mailed to all Georgia Tech employees.   
 
Illustration 5.1 – GT-DIA Ethics Hotline Awareness Post Card 
 According to the GT-DIA Director, in addition to the post cards, “we’ve also used other 
communication outlets, such as postcard mailings, pens, and various promotional and targeted 
items to advertise the Institute’s ethics hotline.  We believe that these efforts will discourage 
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“fraud opportunists” from committing unethical actions they may have otherwise committed 
without the proper awareness” (Auditing 2013). 
At the departmental level, GT-DIA has invested in technology which has enabled them to 
meet the need of integrating with Federal and State law enforcement during Special Reviews 
where law enforcement assistance has been necessary (Auditing 2013).  Furthermore, the 
department has invested in a high-end computer workstation with advanced multimedia 
hardware and software to generate training materials, including curriculum for fraud risk 
identification and ethics training (Auditing 2013).  According to the GT-DIA Director, the ethics 
hotline, fraud detection tools, and awareness campaigns are all directly and indirectly attributable 
to HB 1113 and subsequent USG employee malfeasance reporting requirements (Auditing 2013).  
This data indicates that GT-DIA and Georgia Tech have invested in proper resources and tools to 
not only detect employee malfeasance, but to educate the campus in an effort to deter fraudulent 
behavior. 
6. External Assessment 
 
 GT-DIA has also been reviewed and commented on by its peers in the auditing industry 
and from executives with the State of Georgia’s Government.  According to its policy, GT-DIA 
must undergo a period peer evaluation called an External Quality Assessment (EQA) (Auditing 
2013).  This is to ensure compliance with the Quality Assurance requirements outlined in Section 
560 of the IIA Standards (The Institute of Internal Auditors 1997, 80).  GT-DIA’s most recent 
EQA was performed in 2012 and the executive summary of the subsequent report outlined the 
peer perception of GT-DIA’s operations.  The external auditors conducting the EQA, Ms. Betsy 
Bowers, Mr. William Mulcahy, and Mr. Gottesman stated,  
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GT DIA is known as the ‘go to’ internal audit operation among its 
higher education peers. This office is seen as a leader in 
Information Technology (IT), forensic, PCard, and departmental 
auditing. Internal Audit has also been a catalyst for the 
establishment and upcoming launch of the Institute’s control self 
assessment. Recently, a Forensic Audit unit was established in 
DIA. We note, however, that these activities have undermined the 
full cadre of services DIA may provide GT. Currently, Institute 
perception of DIA is of being exclusively campus investigators 
instead of the more helpful reputation of assurance specialists and 
consultants. During the upcoming year, we believe the DIA will be 
recognized for their assurance and consulting activities because of 
the strategic vision of the Director/Chief Audit Executive (CAE) of 
the DIA (Bowers, Mulcahy and Gottesman 2012, 4). 
 In addition to their auditing industry peers, GT-DIA’s efforts on investigating employee 
malfeasance have garnered the respect from state officials in law enforcement. According to a 
news report in 2011 regarding a Georgia Tech Professor who had allegedly engaged in 
fraudulent activity, the question arose of why Georgia Tech seems to be in the news regarding 
employee malfeasance?  During the interview with the news report, Georgia Senior Assistant 
Attorney General David McLaughlin praised GT-DIA for their diligence. He stated that, “it may 
seem like Georgia Tech has a lot of these cases, but it could just be that the school is better at 
catching wrongdoing and reporting it” (WSB TV 2011).  It appears that GT-DIA’s reputation as 
subject matter experts on detecting and reporting employee malfeasance has been a result of their 
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efforts in complying with the aftermath of HB 1113. 
 
Conclusions 
 The evidence collected indicates that HB 1113 and subsequent USG policy changes have 
had a profound impact on Georgia Tech and its Department of Internal Auditing.  It is also clear 
that GT-DIA and the public administrators in that department have adjusted to meet the new 
requirements under the law and policy.  These adjustments to their activities, staffing, budgeting, 
employee training, expanded resources and tools have not only enabled them to comply with 
USG reporting requirements, but according to their peers, they have become the higher education 
example for investigating and reporting on employee malfeasance.  Based on the evidence 
reviewed in the case study, the data suggests that the public administrators of GT-DIA have 
successfully and comprehensively adjusted to the significant USG policy changes resulting from 
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Appendix A: Interview Questions for Georgia Tech’s Chief Audit Executive 
 
1. Was your internal auditing department affected by the passage of Georgia 2008 House 
Bill 1113 (HB 1113) and subsequent USG policy change in regards to reporting 
suspected employee malfeasance? 
If yes, please describe the immediate and long term effects on your department. 
 
2. Has HB 1113 and subsequent USG policy changes on reporting suspected employee 
malfeasance had an effect on your department’s budgetary planning and funding? 
If yes, please describe the effects on budgetary planning and funding. 
 
3. Has HB 1113 and subsequent USG policy changes on reporting suspected employee 
malfeasance had an effect on your department’s staffing? 
If yes, please describe the effects on staffing. 
 
4. Has HB 1113 and subsequent USG policy changes on reporting suspected employee 
malfeasance had an effect on the training /certifications your staff has received? 
If yes, please describe the effects on training. 
 
5. Has HB 1113 and subsequent USG policy changes on reporting suspected employee 
malfeasance had an effect on the tools or technology your department utilizes? 
If yes, please describe the effects on departmental tools or technology. 
 
6. Has HB 1113 and subsequent USG policy changes on reporting suspected employee 
malfeasance had an effect with your department’s campus communication efforts? 
If yes, please describe the effects on campus communication. 
 
7. Has HB 1113 and subsequent USG policy changes on reporting suspected employee 
malfeasance raised awareness of employee malfeasance on your campus? 















Appendix C: GT-DIA QAR Report, Executive Summary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
